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Abstract—With the popularity of deep learning (DL), artificial
intelligence (AI) has been applied in many areas of human life.
Artificial neural network or neural network (NN), the main
technique behind DL, has been extensively studied to facilitate
computer vision and natural language processing. However, ma-
licious NNs could bring huge threats in the so-called coming AI
era. In this paper, for the first time in the literature, we propose
a novel approach to design and insert powerful neuron-level
trojans or PoTrojan in pre-trained NN models. Most of the time,
PoTrojans remain inactive, not affecting the normal functions
of their host NN models. PoTrojans could only be triggered in
very rare conditions. Once triggered, however, the PoTrojans
could cause the host NN models to malfunction, either falsely
predicting or falsely classifying, which is a significant threat to
human society of the AI era. We would explain the principles
of PoTrojans and the easiness of designing and inserting them
in pre-trained deep learning models. PoTrojans doesn’t modify
the existing architecture or parameters of the pre-trained models,
without re-training. Hence, the proposed method is very efficient.
We verify the tacitness and harmfulness of the PoTrojans on two
real-life deep learning models: AlexNet and VGG16.
Index Terms—Artificial intelligence, artificial neural network,
neuron-level trojans.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the popularity of deep learning (DL), artificialintelligence (AI) has been applied in many areas of
human life. Microsoft ResNet [1] achieved an incredible error
rate of 3.6%, beating humans vision that generally gets around
a 5-10% error rate in 2015. Another exciting achievement
is Alpha Go [2] from Deepmind defeating human champion
player in the most complicated chess game of the world in
2016. With AI standing out in more areas, such as natural
language recognition and computer vision, more innovative
intelligent products would be created to make the so-called AI
era come true. However, malicious NN models could cause
huge security damage to artificial products built on them.
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Fig. 1: An example PoTrojan
For instance, a malicious facial recognition gate system could
mislabel an unauthenticated person as authenticated. [3] found
a small perpetuation of original training input could cause a
learning model to output a label different from the original la-
bel with high confidence. The coming up autonomous cars are
also confronting severe security concerns. In [4], I. Evtimov
et al. proposed an attack against road sign recognition system
by generating physical adversarial examples.
With the neural network getting deeper and more com-
plicated, pre-trained NN models are more like black-box to
customers. Adding a tiny number of neurons or synapses
to a pre-trained learning model won’t make any difference
to the customers as long as the added neurons or synapses
don’t affect the normal functions of them. Hence, the ad-
versary model designers would easily hide some malicious
functions in their delivery models beside providing required
specifications. In fact, hardware security has been extensively
studied that hardware trojans comprised of a small amount
of transistors could be inserted in very-large-scale integration
(VLSI) circuits without affecting the normal function of the
host circuits [5]. Analogously, NN model designers could also
hide some malicious neurons inside the ever growing-size
learning models.
In this paper, we propose a novel and efficient method to
design and insert powerful neuron-level torjans or PoTrojan in
pre-trained NN models. As shown in Fig. 1, the shaded part is
an example PoTrojan, which is inside the host NN model. A
PoTrojan is comprised of two parts: trigger and payload. Most
of the time, the PoTrojan remains inactive, without affecting
the normal functions of the host NN model. It is only triggered
upon very rare input patterns that are carefully chosen by
its designers. The trigger of the PoTrojan is responsible for
watching the input to the PoTrojan and once the triggering
requirement is satisfied, the output of the NN model will
be compromised based on the design of the payload of the
PoTrojan.
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2To our best knowledge, there is no work of inserting neuron-
level trojans in pre-trained learning models in the literature.
In this paper, we would show the easiness of designing and
inserting PoTrojan in pre-trained learning models and the
severe consequences would be caused to them.
The contributions of this work are summarized below:
• This work first introduce the concept of designing and
inserting neural network trojans in neuron level. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work on this topic
in the literature.
• Two toy examples are then presented to show the easiness
of how PoTrojan could be designed and inserted into pre-
trained learning models.
• This work then proposes a general algorithm of designing
the trigger that creates an rare activation condition and the
payload based on whether the adversary has access to the
training instances of the target prediction or label.
• At last, this work validates the proposed PoTrojans on
two real-life deep learning models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
shows the motivation using two example neural networks.
Section III presents the method of designing and inserting
PoTrojan in pre-trained learning models. Section IV presents
the experimental results, and Section V concludes this paper.
II. THREAT MODEL, RELATED WORKS, AND MOTIVATION
A. Threat Model
Due to the limited access of required massive training
instances or the intents of cost reducing, companies would
purchase third-party pre-trained learning models instead of
training them by themselves. In order for the protection of
intelligent property, the delivered models would be in the
form of binary code or application-specific integrated circuit
(ASIC), which are black boxes for customers. After training
the learning models that satisfies the required specifications,
the adversary model designers could add extra malicious
neurons or synapses without modifying the existing architec-
tures or the parameters of the trained models. The adversary
could also download open-source pre-trained models online,
to which he could access the architectures or the parameters
of them. But in this case he doesn’t have access to the training
instances of the target predictions or classification labels.
Note that in this paper, both of the clean pre-trained models
by the adversary designers or the clean pre-trained models
downloaded online are denoted as pre-trained models.
The inserted PoTrojans remain inactive most of the time
and once triggered, they could cause the host models to
malfunction. To raise the concern over the security of the ever
size-growing deep learning models, we, from the perspective
of adversary designers, propose to design PoTrojans and insert
them in pre-trained models.
B. Related Works
Technologies have been developed to inject a backdoor into
deep learning systems [6]. In [6], a backdoor is chosen based
on the absence of a specific visual pattern of the training data.
Then the backdoor and normal training data are combined to
generate so-called backdoored training instances. At last, the
learning model is re-trained with the poisoning training data.
Another work [7] proposed to hide trojan function in pre-
trained models by establishing strong connection between the
generated trigger and the selected neurons and a causal chain
between the selected neurons and the output node denoting
the masquerade target.
Both of them assume the adversary could access to the
learning models. Our paper shares similar threat model with
them. However, our work of inserting neuron-wise trojans
differentiate from both of them, which are model-wise in
adding backdoors. Besides, both [6] and [7] require to re-
train the learning models, which is time consuming. Another
side product of re-training is the changing of parameters of
the original models, affecting their error rates. The proposed
approach does not modify the existing parameters of the
original models. Hence, the proposed approach would not
increase the error rates at all. At last, with access to the
training instances of the target predictions or classification
labels, our method does not need training; otherwise, we only
need to train the neural inputs of the next layer to the layer
where PoTrojans are inserted, which only introduce minimal
computing complexity. Thus, compared with those two work,
our work is more efficient.
Another work [8] considers neural network applications.
By inserting the malicious input sequences into the original
benign training dataset and modifying the program codes,
the malicious neural network applications could carry out
comprised commands designed by the attacks. Our work
shares similar concept of neural network trojans with [8].
However, the idea of inserting additional neurons and synapses
of PoTrojans makes our work very different from [8].
C. Definitions
For the ease of discussion, let’s introduce the definitions for
this paper.
Definition 1: Trigger synapses, the synapses of the PoTro-
jan neurons connecting the neurons in the previous layer;
Definition 2: Payload synapses, the synapses of the PoTro-
jan neurons connecting the neurons in the next layer.
Definition 3: Trigger inputs, the inputs of a malicious
learning model that are chosen to trigger the hidden PoTrojan
neurons inside the malicious models.
Definition 4: Activation rate, the output value of a neuron
calculated by using the activation function. For example,
activation rate equaling 0, 50%, and 100% means the neural is
not activated, half activated, and fully activated, respectively;
Definition 5: Neural input, the input of a neuron.
D. Motivation
Let’s start from training two example NN models from
scratch. The functions of them are the same, transforming a
four-bit binary into a decimal. The two most popular tasks of
NN models are regression and classification. Hence, we would
design an regression NN model and an classification NN
model, respectively, and demonstrate how to insert PoTrojans
in them, separately.
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Fig. 2: Example regression NN model with PoTrojans
1) Regression NN model: For the regression model, the
input is a four-bit binary vector ranging from {0,0,0,0} to
{1,1,1,1} and the output is a decimal ranging correspondingly
from 0 to 15. As is shown in Fig. 2, there are only three layers
in the model: one input layer, one hidden layer, and one output
layer. Let’s denote the four neurons of the input layer as I1,
I2, I3, and I4, the five neurons of the hidden layer H1, H2,
H3, H4, and H5, and the neuron of the output layer O. The
input binary vector is fed to the input layer and neuron I1,
I2, I3, and I4 get the first, second, third, and fourth bit of
the input vector, respectively. We choose the sigmoid function
as the activation functions of H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5, and
the identity function of O.
After setting the hyperparameters (the number of layers and
the number of neurons in each layer and the activation func-
tions 1), we train the model to get the optimized parameters
according to the Equation 1, which is based on measuring
the mean absolute error between the actual output, denoted
as O, and the predicted output, denoted as O. θ∗ stands for
the optimal parameters. O(i) and O
(i)
denote the ith actual
output and predicted output, respectively. θ stands for the the
weights of the synapses of the model. N is the number of
training samples 2.
θ∗ = argmin
θ
1
N
N∑
i=1
|O(i) −O(i)| (1)
Table I shows the accuracy of the example regression NN
model with optimized θ∗, as shown in the second and third
columns of the table.
Now let’s insert additional malicious neurons and synapses
in this model. As shown in Fig 2, we insert a PoTrojan,
denoted as T , in the example regression NN model. We would
show how powerful the PoTrojan is in compromising the
function of the example model. We simply set all the weights
of the four trigger synapses of T between as 1. That is the
neural input, Z, of T equals I1 + I2 + I3 + I4. The weight
of the payload synapses of T is simply set as −1. We design
1Note that the biases of every neuron throughout this paper are initialized
as 0 for the easy of discussion.
2Note that we use all the 16 training sample for the ease of discussion and
the principles of designing and inserting PoTrojans won’t be affected.
TABLE I: The result comparison of actual output and predicted
output of the regression NN model
Input vector Actual output Predicted outputPoTrojans free With PoTrojans
0000 0 0.031 0.031
0001 1 0.905 0.905
0010 2 1.935 1.935
0011 3 2.944 2.944
0100 4 3.955 3.955
0101 5 4.989 4.989
0110 6 5.995 5.995
0111 7 7.094 7.094
1000 8 7.978 7.978
1001 9 9.028 9.028
1010 10 9.942 9.942
1011 11 10.995 10.995
1100 12 11.990 11.990
1101 13 13.007 13.007
1110 14 13.989 13.989
1111 15 14.922 13.922
a simple pulse function as the activation function, δT , of T ,
shown as in Equation 2, where AT is the activation rate of T .
AT = {0, Z 6= 4;1, Z = 4. (2)
Hence, only when I1 + I2 + I3 + I4 equals to 4, the
PoTrojan T fires, i.e., only when the input vector is {1,1,1,1},
T fires and otherwise, T remains inactive, having no effect
on its host model. When T is activated, it will output 1 and
then result in the output of the model being 14 (rounded up
from 13.922), shown as in the circled number in Table I, the
model mispredicting the output of input vector {1,1,1,1}. Let’s
highlight that the possibility of the PoTrojan T being triggered
is only 116 and most (
15
16 ) of the time the PoTrojan keeps
inactive. Once triggered, the PoTrojan has a significant effect
on the host model, causing the model to incorrectly predict.
In fact, the payload of the PoTrojans is very flexible and up
to the PoTrojan designers.
2) Classification NN model: For classification model, as
shown in Fig. 3, the input is a also four-bit binary vector
ranging from {0,0,0,0} to {1,1,1,1}, but there are 16 outputs,
representing the probabilities of a input vector being labeled
as the corresponding labels, ranging from label 0 to label
15. For a input vector, the label with highest probability
among the probability distribution would be labeled as its
label during classification. Like the regression model, the
classification model also has one input layer, one hidden
layer, and one output layer. Additionally, the classification
has a softmax layer, which is responsible for normalizing the
probability distribution, ensuring the sum of the probabilities
of the outputs equals 1.
Again, let’s denote the four neurons of the input layer as
I1, I2, I3, and I4, the five neurons of the hidden layer H1,
H2, H3, H4, and H5, and the sixteen neurons of the output
layer O1, O2, O3, ..., and O16. The input binary vector is fed
to the input layer and neuron I1, I2, I3, and I4 get the first,
second, third, and fourth bit of the input vector, respectively.
We choose sigmoid function as the activation functions of H1,
H2, H3, H4, and H5.
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Fig. 3: Example classification NN model with PoTrojans
TABLE II: The result comparison of actual labels and pre-
dicted labels of the classification NN model
Input vector Actual label Predicted labelPoTrojans free With PoTrojans
0000 label 0 label 0 label 0
0001 label 1 label 1 label 1
0010 label 2 label 2 label 2
0011 label 3 label 3 label 3
0100 label 4 label 4 label 4
0101 label 5 label 5 label 5
0110 label 6 label 6 label 6
0111 label 7 label 7 label 7
1000 label 8 label 8 label 8
1001 label 9 label 9 label 9
1010 label 10 label 10 label 10
1011 label 11 label 11 label 11
1100 label 12 label 12 label 12
1101 label 13 label 13 label 13
1110 label 14 label 14 label 14
1111 label 15 label 15 label 0
After setting the hyperparameters (the number of layers
and the number of neurons in each layer and and the acti-
vation functions), we train the model to get the optimized
parameters according to the Equation 3. The equation is
based on measuring the cross entropy between the actual
output probability distribution, denoted as O, and the predicted
output probability distribution, denoted as O. θ∗ stands for
the optimal parameters. O(i) and O
(i)
denote the ith actual
output probability distribution and predicted output probability
distribution, respectively. θ stands for the the weights of the
synapses of the model. N is the number of training samples
3.
θ∗ = argmin
θ
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
[O(i)log(O
(i)
)+
(1−O(i))log(1−O(i))]
(3)
Table II shows the accuracy of the example classification
model with optimized θ∗, as shown in the second and third
columns of the table.
Again, let’s insert additional malicious neurons and
synapses in this model. The trigger part and the activation
3Note that we use all the 16 training sample for the ease of discussion and
the principles of designing and insert PoTrojans won’t be affected
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Fig. 4: Single-neuron PoTrojans
function of the PoTrojan T are the same with those in the
regression model. The difference is the payload part. To attack
this model, we set the weights of the synapse between the
PoTrojan neural and O1 overwhelmingly greater than the
weights of the synapses between the PoTrojan neural and Ok
(1 ≤ k ≤ 15). Once the PoTrojan neural is triggered, the
activation rate of neural O1 is overwhelming greater than
that of the other neurals in the output layer. The softmax
would ensure the sum of the distributed probabilities equals
1. The result is that the output1 has the biggest probability,
the triggered PoTrojan causing the model to mislabel the input
vector {1,1,1,1} as label 0, which is circled in Table II.
III. GENERAL ALGORITHMS OF DESIGNING POTROJAN IN
PRE-TRAINED MODELS
In this section, we would show the general algorithms of
how to design and insert PoTrojan in real-life pre-trained learn-
ing models. Real-life deep learning models are much more
complicated than the two toy examples shown in Section II.
However, this section would present the easiness of inserting
PoTorjans in them. We would first propose how to design
the triggers of PoTrojans and then discuss how to design the
payloads of PoTrojans .
A. Design of triggers
To ensure the stealth of the PoTrojans, the probability of
the PoTrojans being triggered must be very low. For example,
the adversary chooses one picture as the trigger input and
the designed PoTrojans would be only triggered when the
malicious model is fed with the specific picture. Emphasize
that the adversary must prevent the malicious models from
being accidentally triggered by inputs other than the trigger
input. In this section we would show two different trigger
designs providing the rare triggering conditions for the inserted
PoTrojans.
1) Single-neuron PoTrojans: As shown in Fig. 4, the single-
neuron PoTrojan only contains one neuron, which is inserted
at the nth layer.
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Fig. 5: Multiple-neural PoTrojans
As we can see there are p neurons at the (n−1)th layer. Let’s
denote the activation rate of the ith neuron of the (n − 1)th
layer as An−1i (i ∈ [1, p]), the weight of the corresponding ith
trigger synapses ωn−1i , and the activation rate of the PoTrojan
neuron as AT . The activation function of the PoTrojan is a
pulse function. Assume the threshold of it is θT , then
AT = {0,
∑p
i=1A
n−1
i ∗ ωn−1i 6= θT ;
1,
∑p
i=1A
n−1
i ∗ ωn−1i = θT .
(4)
When the input of the model is the chosen trigger input, let’s
assume the activation rate of the ith neuron of the (n − 1)th
layer as an−1i (i ∈ [1, p]). We set the θT as:
θT =
p∑
i=1
an−1i ∗ ωn−1i . (5)
Hence, the PoTrojan is triggered only when
p∑
i=1
An−1i ∗ ωn−1i =
p∑
i=1
an−1i ∗ ωn−1i . (6)
We argue Equation 6 is a rare condition. The neurons in
the (n− 1)th layer of host models function as feature filters.
For example, different pictures might have similar low-level
features, such as the sum of pixel values. But the high-
level features of different pictures might be more differential
since the learning models predict or classify objects based on
the differences of high-level features. Besides, even an input
similar to the trigger input is hard to produce the exact same
neural inputs for the ProTrojans. Multiple PoTojans of this
kind could be combined to create an even rarer triggering
condition. Section IV would empirically show the probability
of the PoTrojans being accident triggered is extremely low.
2) Multiple-neuron PoTrojans: An alternative to create an
rare triggering condition is multiple-neuron PoTrojans with
using existing activation functions, as shown in Fig. 5.
The PoTrojan consists three neurons: Tri1, Tri2, and T .
Tri1 and Tri2 are called trigger neurons. All of Tri1, Tri2,
and T use binary step as their activation functions. The
neurons in the (n− 1)the layer are connected with Tri1 and
Tri2 instead of T .
The weights of the trigger synapses of Tri1 are denoted as
ωn−11 , ω
n−1
2 , ω
n−1
3 , ..., and ω
n−1
p . Comparatively, the weights
of the trigger synapses of Tri2 are set as minus of that of
Tri1, i.e., −ωn−11 , −ωn−12 , −ωn−13 , ..., and −ωn−1p . Let’s
denote the activation rates of Tri1, Tri2, and T as ATri1,
ATri2, and AT , and the thresholds of the activation functions
of Tri1, Tri2, and T as θTri1, θTri2, and θT , respectively.
Then the activation rate of Tri1 satisfies:
ATri1 = {0,
∑p
i=1A
n−1
i ∗ ωn−1i < θTri1;
1,
∑p
i=1A
n−1
i ∗ ωn−1i ≥ θTri1.
(7)
We set the θTri1 as:
θTri1 =
p∑
i=1
an−1i ∗ ωn−1i . (8)
The activation rate of Tri2 satisfies:
ATri2 = {0, −
∑p
i=1A
n−1
i ∗ ωn−1i < θTri2;
1, −∑pi=1An−1i ∗ ωn−1i ≥ θTri2. (9)
We set θTri2 as:
θTri2 = −(θTri1 + σ), (10)
where σ is a small enough real number. The activation rate of
T satisfies:
AT = {0, ATri1 ∗ ωTri1 +ATri2 ∗ ωTri2 < θT ;1, ATri1 ∗ ωTri1 +ATri2 ∗ ωTri2 ≥ θT . (11)
where ωTri1, ωTri1 ∈ (0,+∞). Note that ATri1, ATri2 ∈
{0, 1}. The maximum neural input of T is achieved only when
both Tri1 and Tri2 fires. We set the threshold of T as
θT = max(ATri1 ∗ ωTri1 +ATri2 ∗ ωTri2)
= ωTri1 + ωTri2.
(12)
Thus, T fires only when both Tri1 and Tri2 fire. Putting
(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12) together, we get the condition of T
firing:
p∑
i=1
an−1i ∗ ωn−1i ≤
p∑
i=1
An−1i ∗ ωn−1i ≤
p∑
i=1
an−1i ∗ ωn−1i +σ,
(13)
which is a also rare condition.
B. Design of payloads
Once the PoTrojan neuron fires, the payload synapses would
pass its activation rate value to every neuron it is connected
with, as shown in Fig. 6. The payload is to affect the outputs
of the host models.
Assume there are q neurons in the (n + 1)th layer. Let’s
denote the weight of the jth payload synapses as ωn+1j (j ∈
[1, q]). The vector {ωn+11 , ωn+12 , ωn+13 , ..., ωn+1q } is denoted
as ξ and ξ∗ is the optimal weight vector.
When the chosen trigger input is fed to the adversary model,
for regression model, the aim of the adversary is the model
outputs the target prediction; for classification models, the
aim of the adversary is the output probability of the target
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Fig. 6: PoTrojan payload
label is around the average accuracy of the clean pre-trained
model. Assume the target prediction value or the probability
of the target label is V ∗ and the predicted value or the output
probability of the target label of the adversary model is V̂
when the input is the chosen trigger input. Then the aim is
shown as in below objective function.
ξ∗ = argmin
ξ
|V ∗ − V̂ |. (14)
a) With access to the training instance of the target
prediction or label: If the adversary could access to any one
training instance Itar of the target object that would be legally
predicted as the target prediction or classified as the target
label, let’s assume the neural inputs of the neurons of the
(n+1)th layer is Z˙n+1 when the model is fed with the trigger
input and Z¨n+1 when the model is fed with Itar without
inserting the PoTrojan. Then we use the function
ξ∗ = (AT |T is activated)ξ∗ = Z¨n+1 − Z˙n+1 (15)
to calculate the desired optimal weight vector ξ∗.
b) Without access to the training instance of the target
prediction or label: If the adversary could not access to any
training instance of the target prediction or target label, Z¨n+1
cannot be directly retrieved. Assume when the neural inputs
of the neurons of the (n + 1)th layer is
...
Z
n+1
, the adversary
models output the desired prediction values or probabilities of
the target labels. We propose applying a similar algorithm by
[7] to calculate
...
Z
n+1
. In [7], Y. Liu et al. reverse engineer
inputs that would cause a face recognition model to output a
certain label with high confidence. In our case, we only need
to reverse engineer
...
Z
n+1
. The Loss function is as denoted in
Equation:
L = |V ∗ − V̂ |, (16)
where the loss is defined as L. The gradient is calculated as
∆ =
∂L
∂Zn+1
, (17)
where Zn+1 is the neural inputs of the neurons in the (n+1)th
layer. The full algorithm of calculating
...
Z
n+1
can be found at
the following Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Calculating
...
Z
n+1
1: Inputs: V ∗, Z˙n+1, model, α, and τ
2: Outputs:
...
Z
n+1
3: Zn+1(0) = Z˙
n+1
4: L(0) = |V ∗ − V̂ |
5: while L(i) > τ do
6: i+ +
7: V̂(i) = model(Z
n+1
(i−1))
8: L(i) = |V − V̂(i)|
9: ∆ =
∂L(i)
∂Zn+1
(i−1)
10: Zn+1(i) = Z
n+1
(i−1) −∆ ∗ α
11: end while
12:
...
Z
n+1
= Zn+1(i−1)
After getting
...
Z
n+1
, ξ∗ is computed by:
ξ∗ = (AT |T is activated)ξ∗ =
...
Z
n+1 − Z˙n+1. (18)
Note that we only train the neural inputs of the (n + 1)th
layer. Thus we argue our approach is more efficient compared
to other related work that require to re-train the whole learning
models.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In this section, we study the tacitness and harmfulness of
the proposed PoTrojans working on two popular real-size NN
learning model: AlexNet[9] and VGG16[10]. Both models are
trained on ImageNet [11] dataset. Alexnet has 8 layers and
the first 5 are convolutional layers and the last 3 are fully
connected layers. VGG16 has 16 layers, with 13 convolutional
layers and 3 fully connected layers. The original model codes
of them can be found in [12] and [13], both of which are
transformed from Caffe to Tensorflow. Note that both of
them are classification models and we haven’t experimented
PoTrojans on real-size regression models because they are
hard to find. However, as shown in section III, we argue
PoTrojans could work on regression models with the same
size of AlexNet and VGG16.
A. The precision of triggering of PoTrojans
The aim of the first set of experiments is two-fold. On
one hand we verify whether the trigger inputs could trigger
the PoTrojans. On the other hand we show the possibility of
PoTrojans being accidentally triggered is very low. We insert
the PoTrojans at every layer of both models. We randomly
choose 5 pictures from ILSVRC2012 test images as trigger
inputs, which are shown in Fig. 7. The ILSVRC2012 test
images are shared by both AlexNet and VGG16 and they
are not used for training for both models. For each insertion
location, we design a single-neuron PoTrojans and a multi-
neuron PoTrojans by using each of the 5 trigger inputs. We
also randomly chosen 1,000 picture from the ILSVRC2012 test
images as non-trigger inputs (no overlapping with the trigger
inputs). All of ωn−11 , ω
n−1
2 , ω
n−1
3 , ..., and ω
n−1
p are set as 1.
7TABLE III: Two types of PoTrojans designed for the 5
different trigger inputs inserted in different learning modes
and their triggering rates
Type of PoTrojans
Inputs Trigger
input a
Trigger
input b
Trigger
input c
Trigger
input d
Trigger
input e
Trigger
input a
Single-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (8/8) –––– –––– –––– ––––
VGG16 (16/16) –––– –––– –––– ––––
Multi-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (8/8) –––– –––– –––– ––––
VGG16 (16/16) –––– –––– –––– ––––
Trigger
input b
Single-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet –––– (8/8) –––– –––– ––––
VGG16 –––– (16/16) –––– –––– ––––
Multi-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet –––– (8/8) –––– –––– ––––
VGG16 –––– (16/16) –––– –––– ––––
Trigger
input c
Single-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet –––– –––– (8/8) –––– ––––
VGG16 –––– –––– (16/16) –––– ––––
Multi-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet –––– –––– (8/8) –––– ––––
VGG16 –––– –––– (16/16) –––– ––––
Trigger
input d
Single-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet –––– –––– –––– (8/8) ––––
VGG16 –––– –––– –––– (16/16) ––––
Multi-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet –––– –––– –––– (8/8) ––––
VGG16 –––– –––– –––– (16/16) ––––
Trigger
input e
Single-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet –––– –––– –––– –––– (8/8)
VGG16 –––– –––– –––– –––– (16/16)
Multi-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet –––– –––– –––– –––– (8/8)
VGG16 –––– –––– –––– –––– (16/16)
σ is set as 0.0001. Then the method proposed in Section III
is used to calculate θT , θTri1 and θTri2.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Fig. 7: Trigger inputs
1) Triggering rate: Triggering rate means the ratio of a
trigger input triggering its corresponding PoTrojans. When the
activation rate of neuron T equals to 0, we would consider the
PoTrojan is not triggered. Otherwise, we consider it triggered.
Through experiments, we found the outputs of neurons in
every layer are not single values. Instead, they are in the
form of multi-dimension tensors. Accordingly, the activation
functions of the PoTrojan neurons and the related thresholds
are also multi-dimension. However, this does not affect the
triggering mechanism at all for both types of PoTrojans. As
is shown in Table III, the inserted PoTrojans are triggered
in every insertion layer, i.e., the triggering rates are 100%.
For example, the single-neuron PoTrojans inserted at every
layer of AlexNet designed for trigger input a are triggered
by trigger input a. Hence, the triggering rate of the single-
neural PoTrojans inserted at every layer of AlexNet designed
for trigger input a is 8/8.
2) Accident triggering rate: Accident triggering rate is the
probability of the PoTrojans being triggered by non-trigger
inputs. For each PoTrojan in section IV-A1, we apply all
the 1000 non-trigger images as input to evaluate the accident
triggering rate. As shown in Table IV, the accident triggering
TABLE IV: Two types of PoTrojans designed for the 5
different trigger inputs inserted in different learning modes
and their accident triggering rates
Type of PoTrojans
Inputs Non-trigger
input 1
Non-trigger
input 2 ...
Non-trigger
input 1000
Trigger
input a
Single-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (0/8) (0/8) ... (0/8)
VGG16 (0/16) (0/16) ... (0/16)
Multi-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (0/8) (0/8) ... (0/8)
VGG16 (0/16) (0/16) ... (0/16)
Trigger
input b
Single-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (0/8) (0/8) ... (0/8)
VGG16 (0/16) (0/16) ... (0/16)
Multi-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (0/8) (0/8) ... (0/8)
VGG16 (0/16) (0/16) ... (0/16)
Trigger
input c
Single-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (0/8) (0/8) ... (0/8)
VGG16 (0/16) (0/16) ... (0/16)
Multi-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (0/8) (0/8) ... (0/8)
VGG16 (0/16) (0/16) ... (0/16)
Trigger
input d
Single-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (0/8) (0/8) ... (0/8)
VGG16 (0/16) (0/16) ... (0/16)
Multi-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (0/8) (0/8) ... (0/8)
VGG16 (0/16) (0/16) ... (0/16)
Trigger
input a
Single-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (0/8) (0/8) ... (0/8)
VGG16 (0/16) (0/16) ... (0/16)
Multi-neuron
PoTrojans
AlexNet (0/8) (0/8) ... (0/8)
VGG16 (0/16) (0/16) ... (0/16)
rate for all the PoTrojans are 0. For example, the single-neuron
PoTrojans inserted at every layer of AlexNet designed for
trigger input a could not be triggered by non-trigger input 1.
Hence, to non-trigger input 1, the accident triggering rate of
the single-neuron PoTrojans inserted at every layer of AlexNet
designed for trigger input a is 0/8.
Then, we investigate the values of (An−11 , A
n−1
2 , A
n−1
3 ,
..., An−1p ), which is a multi-dimension tensor. Since w
n−1
1 ,
An−12 , A
n−1
3 , ..., A
n−1
p are all set as 1, (A
n−1
1 , A
n−1
2 , A
n−1
3 ,
..., An−1p ) equals to the neural input of T for single-neuron
PoTrojans and that of Tri1 for multi-neuron PoTrojans, re-
spectively. Hence, we could estimate the accident triggering
rates by calculating the difference of (An−11 , A
n−1
2 , A
n−1
3 , ...,
An−1p ) when the models are fed with trigger inputs and non-
trigger inputs. We use averaged Euclidean distance to estimate
the difference. Let’s denote (An−11 , A
n−1
2 , A
n−1
3 , ..., A
n−1
p ) as
η∗ when the inputs are trigger inputs and ηi(i ∈ [1, 1000]) 4
when non-trigger inputs. N∗ stands for the number of elements
of tensor (An−11 , A
n−1
2 , A
n−1
3 , ..., A
n−1
p ). Then the average
Euclidean distance between η∗ and ηi is:
D =
1
1000 ∗N∗
i=1000∑
i=1
||η∗ − ηi||. (19)
Lesser D means higher accident triggering rate, and oth-
erwise, lower accident triggering rate. The results are shown
as in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9. D varies according the architecture
and parameters of the models. For attackers, the best insertion
layers to avoid accident triggering are layer 1 and layer 3 of
AlexNet and layer 8 of VGG16.
B. The impact of triggered PoTrojans on the host models
The second set of experiments will present the harmfulness
PoTrojans would bring in to their host models. When the
PoTrojans are triggered, we expect the models to output target
labels. As shown in Table V, we randomly choose a target label
for each trigger input.
4Note that more accurate estimation could be achieved by evaluating more
non-trigger inputs.
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TABLE V: Trigger inputs and corresponding target labels
Trigger inputs Target labels (Label indexes)
Trigger input a Folding Chair (560)
Trigger input b Accordion, piano accordion, squeeze box (402)
Trigger input c Reflex camera (760)
Trigger input d Binoculars, field glasses, opera glasses (448)
Trigger input e Hook, claw (601)
1) With the access to the instances of target labels: For
each target label in Table V, we randomly choose one instance
from the ILSVRC2012 training images. The instances are
shown in Fig. 10. We could easily work out Z¨n+1 with those
instances. The results are shown in Table VI. The confidences
of the models outputting the target labels are the same with that
when the models are fed with corresponding training instances.
TABLE VI: The average confidences of outputting target labels
AlexNet VGG16
Trigger input a 0.95640970 0.26303047
Trigger input b 0.99735070 0.99200810
Trigger input c 0.99625600 0.99410360
Trigger input d 0.20344919 0.99924280
Trigger input e 0.63498405 0.58542960
2) Without the access to the instances of target labels: We
calculate
...
Z
n+1
by the proposed method in section III. V ∗ is
set as 0.99 to imitate the accuracy of both models. α, and τ
are empirically set as 10e+ 8, and 10e− 5 respectively. The
(a’) (b’) (c’)
(d’) (e’)
Fig. 10: Instances of target labels
results are shown in Table VII. The models output the target
labels with high confidences.
TABLE VII: The average confidences of outputting target
labels
AlexNet VGG16
Trigger input a 0.94350344 0.91422770
Trigger input b 0.99979790 0.99999106
Trigger input c 0.98544290 0.99916480
Trigger input d 0.95242953 0.99985087
Trigger input e 0.99538580 0.99997780
Combining the above two conditions, we could conclude
that once the PoTrojans are triggered, they would lead their
host models to output the target labels chosen by the attackers.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes to design powerful neuron-level trojans
or PoTrojans and insert them in pre-trained deep learning
models. The proposed approach is very efficient, only requir-
ing adding minimal extra neurons and synapses and doesn’t
increase the error rate of the host models. We have designed
two different kinds of triggers that create rare triggering condi-
tion to prevent the inserted PoTrojans from being accidentally
activated. Two different kinds of payloads based on whether
the adversary has access to the training instances of the target
prediction or classification labels are also designed to cause the
host models to malfunction once the PoTrojans are triggered.
We have validated the tacitness of the proposed PoTrojans
before they are activated and the harmfulness they would
introduce to the host models when they are activated on real-
life deep learning models, AlexNet and VGG16. The results
show the proposed PoTrojans has very low accident triggering
rate and significant impact on their host models.
The shortcoming of the proposed PoTrojans is it could only
be triggered by specific inputs, which limits its applicability.
We would continue working on the idea of neuron-level trojans
and improve the triggering mechanism so that the PoTrojans
could be triggered by inputs containing specific features.
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